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Cross-Examination of Defendant's Character Witnesses
In Michelson v. United Staiesl which involved a trial for bribing a
federal revenue agent, the prosecution, knowing of defendant's prior
arrests and convictions, cross-examined the defendant's character witnesses to determine whether they had taken into account rumors or reports of the defendant's involvement in these prior matters in evaluating his character. The character witnesses were asked whether they had
ever heard that on a specified date the defendant had been arrested 2 for
receiving stolen goods. 3 The United States Supreme Court upheld the
defendant's conviction in the face of a claim by defense counsel that the
question asked in cross-examining the character witnesses was improper
and prejudicial to the defendant. In very comprehensive majority and
dissenting opinions the problem of the proper scope of cross-examination
of defense character witnesses was presented.
There appears to be three different views as to the extent that a defense
character witness may be cross-examined in an attempt to show the basis
of his evaluation of the defendant's character.4 First, and most liberal,
is the rule applied in the federal -courts and a large majority of the state
courts5 that the prosecution may test the character witness' qualifications
to give testimony as to the community opinion by asking about reports
of any acts of misconduct which tend to disprove a defendant's claim of
"being a law-abiding citizen." ' 6 The second view is the so-ealled "Illinois
rule" which places a further limitation on the scope of the questions,
namely, that they "must relate to offenses similar to those for which the
1 325 U.S. 469 (1948).
2 According to the overwhelming weight of authority a character witness may be
cross-examined as to an arrest whether or not it culminated in a conviction; seb
Mannix v. United States, 140 F. (2d) 250 (C.C.A. 4th, 1944) ; Josey v. United States,
135 F. (2d) 809 (App. D. C., 1943); Spalitto v. United .States, 39 F. (2d) 782
(C.C.A. 8th, 1930). This rule should not be confused with the opn ywhich prohibits
cross-examination as to credibility by asking a witness whether he himself has been
arrested.
3 It is to be noted that the trial court asked the piosecutor, out o-the presence of
the jury, "Is it a fact according to the best information in your possession that
Michelson was arrested for receiving stolen goodsa" Counsel replied that it was, and
to support his good faith exhibited a paper record which defendant's counsel did not
challenge. 69 S. Ct. 213, 216. It is held to be improper, on cross-examination of the
defendant's character witnesses, to propound a hypothetical question which assumes
that the defendant has been guilty of certain other misconduct, where there is no
evidence therof. Filippelli v. United States, 6 F. (2d) 121 (C.CJ.A 9th, 1925) (queqtion assumed prior arrests); see State v. Shull, 131 Ore., 224, 282 Pac. 237, 71 A. I 3.
1498 (1929).
4 This does not include the Worth CarQlina view that while questioning of character
witnesses, both in chief and on cross-examination, must be limited to the general
character of the accused and not extended to specific acts (State v. Hairston, 121
N. C. 579, 28 S.E. 492 (1897); State v. Nance, 195 N. C. 47, 141 S.E. 468 (1928)),
it is proper to permit character witnesses to answer'in what respect the character is
good or bad, since one or two instances of misconduct do not give a person a totally
bad character. State v. Hairston, 121 N. C. 579, 28 S. E. 492 (1897) ; State v. Daniel,
87 N. C. 507 (1882).
5 See cases collected in 71 A. L. R. 1504 (where decisions of the federal courts and
some 32 state courts show agreement with the ruling in the Michelson case).
6 The rule against questioning a defense character witness about prior acts of misconduct of the defendant must be distinguished from the one which permits evidence
of prior convictions of infamous crimes to be introduced to discredit a witness. fli.
Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 38, §734. Wigmore Evidence (3rd ed., 1940) §987 (indicating
the various rules in American jurisdictions on the introduction of prior convictions
to discredit witnesses).
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defendant is on trial." 7 The- third and strictest rule is the one championed by Justice Rutledge in his dissent in the Michelson case,8 the
"fair-play rule" which would place the same limits upon the crossipon the defense in the
examination by the prosecution as are placed
direct examination of a character witness. 9 According to this view the
entire line of inquiry concerning specific acts in the defendant's past
would be foreclosed, both on cross-examination of witnesses to good
character and on new evidence introduced in rebuttal.
While the decisions give an overwhelming numerical superiority to the
federal rule, an inquiry into the reasoning behind each of the three
theories should provide a basis for understanding the wide divergence in
their scope of permissible questioning. However, certain basic rules of
evidence must be kept in mind before such an understanding is possible.
First, the universal rule is that the prosecution may not initially attack
the defendant's character, but the defendant alone may put his character
in issue.10 As a corollary to this rule the prosecution, in argument to
the jury, may not comment on the failure of the accused to produce
evidence of his good character." Secondly, evidence of good character
or reputation of one charged with a crime always is admissible,' 2 since a
defendant's character is essentially relevant-as indicating the probability
of his doing or not doing the act charged.'8 However, the principle of
relevancy has led to thie rule that the character or disposition offered,
whether for or against the accused, must
have some reasonable similarity
14
to the trait of character in question.
Since reputation is looked to merely as evidence of the character reputed, it follows that the reputation is hearsay testimony, and is receivable as an exception to the Hearsay Rule. Not only is the character
witness permitted to testify from hearsay, but indeed, such a5witness is
not all6wed to base his testimony on anything but hearsay.' Finally,
from this requirement that the witness testify as to hearsay and not
from his own knowledge of the defendant has been evolved the rule that
the proper form of inquiry
is "Have you heard?" while "Do you
6
know?" is not allowed'1
With the above rules and distinctions in mind the basis of permitting
such questioning of a character witness, by the prosecution, becomes
7 See note 8 to opinion of Court of Appeals in United States v. Michelson, 165 F.
(2d) 732 (C.C.A. 2d, 1948) at 735.
8 325 U.S. 469, 495 (1948).
9 State v. Viola, Ohio App. -, 82 N.E. (2d) 306 (1947) (stating that testimony of good character "is limited entirely to a summation of the total character
of the defendant," and it was not error for the trial court to exclude testimony
offered by defendant that he had cooperated in preventing a jail break. Appeal disisWsed 148 Ohio St. 712, 76 N.E. (2d) 715 (1947).
10 Mackreth v. United States, 103 F. (2d) 495 (C.C.A. 5th, 1939); Martin v.
People, 114 Colo: 120, 162 P. (2d) 597 (1945) (challenging the defendant on crossexamination to put his general reputation in issue, held error).
11 State v. Markowitz, 138 Ohio St. 106, 33 N. E. (?d) 1 (1941).
12 Hawley v. United States, 133 F. (2d) 966 (C.C.A. 10th, 1943).
13 Wiginore, Evidence (3rd ed., 1940) .55.
14 Harper v. United States, 170 Fed. 385 (C.C.A. 8th, 1909) (false entry in a bank
report; the defendant's reputation for "Imorality and sobriety" excluded).
15 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed., 19402 §1609; Underhill, Criminal Evidence (4th
ed., 1935) §170; Wharton, Criminal Evidenee, (11th ed., 1935) §333.
16 See Stewart v. United States, 104 F. (2d) 234 (App. D.C., 1939); Little v.
United States, 93 F. (2d) 401 (C.C.A. 8th, 1937); Filippelli v. United States, 6 F.
(2d) 121 (C.C.A. 9th, 1925) (also involving hypothetical question regarding witness'
standard of judging character).
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clearer. Since the testimony given on direct examination is confined to
hearsay, it is necessary to determine whether the witness is sufficiently
well acquainted with the reputation in question to make an evaluation of
it. In other words, has the witness heard enough hearsay about the defendant to be a qualified character witness? This procedure usually
results in most effective cross-examination. If the witness to good character admits having heard of the particular acts of misconduct, his
standard of judging character and reputation is greatly shaken; and if
he has not heard of such acts, this is an indication that he has based his
judgment on incomplete information. It is this testing quality of the
cross-examination that is the basis of the federal rule that questions concerning particular acts of misconduct, only somewhat related to the trait
in question, are proper.
The Michelson case involved bribery, and the question asked concerned
receiving stolen goods. It was this dissimilarity of offenses which
prompted the Court of Appeals to seek adoption by the Supreme Court
of the "Illinois rule" that the scope of cross-examination must be limited to questions which "relate to offenses similar to those for which the
defendant is on trial.'1 7 It is the opinion of this writer that the Illinois
cases appear to adopt a stricter rule than the one sought by the Court
of Appeals, although many of the Illinois cases involve questions phrased
in the objectionable terms of "Do you know? "18
The Illinois court frequently has held that the prosecution may not
cross-examine a character witness by asking about specific acts of misconduct.' 9 A close examination of the cases, however, indicates a confusion of the problem involved. 20 The rule against questioning as to
specific acts was laid down in a case where the prosecution was attempting to rebut the defendant's showing of good character by bringing in
witnesses to testify to particular acts of misconduct. 2 ' The second point
of confusion on this problem is a failure to recognize that questions seeking to bring forth the witness' own knowledge of the particular acts of
misconduct, rather than his familiarity with the defendant's reputation,
are improper. Recognition of the fact that hearsay testimony and nothing more is to be sought on cross-examination of a character witness, and
then only for the purpose of testing the witness' basis of evaluating character, would do a great deal toward clearing up the confusion which
appears in the Illinois decisions and which makes Illinois the only jurisdiction ostensibly laying down so strict a rule.
The so-called "Illinois rule" does not appear to have any basis in the
Illinois cases except for dictum in People v. Hamnon,22 which indicated
17 See note 8 to opinion of Court of Appeals in United States v. Michelson, 165 F.
(2d) 732 (C.C.A. 2d, 1948) at 735 (where, although affirming the conviction, Judge
Frank writing for the court requests the Supreme Court to adopt the go-called "Illinois rule" for the federal courts, which request the .Supreme Court rejected).
18 People v. Hannon, 381 Ill. 206, 44 N. E. (2d) 923 (1942) ; People v. Page, 365
fll. 524, 6 N.E. (2d) 845 (1937); People v. Anderson, 337 Ill. 310, 169 N.E. 243
(1929) ; People v. Celmars, 332 Ill. 113, 163 N. E. 421 (1928).
19 People v. Page, 365 1ll. 524, 6 N.E. (2d) 845 (1937) ; People v. Anderson, 337
Ill. 310, 169 N. E. 243 (1929) ; People v. Celmars, 332 Ill. 113, 163 N. E. 421 (1928) ;
Jennings v. People, 189 Ill. 320, 59 N.E. 515 (1901) (conviction affirmed because
witness replied that he had not heard of the acts of misconduct inquired into and
thus defendant was not prejudiced); Aiken v. People, 183 11. 215, 55 N. E. 695
(1899); McCarty v. People, 51 Ill. 231 (1869).
20 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed., 1940) §988, note 1.
21 McCarty v. People, 51 Ill. 231 (1869).
22 381 Ill. 206, 44 N. E. (2d) 923 (1942).
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that the questions were additionally objectionable for the reason
that the inquiries concerned offenses dissimilar to those for which the
defendant was on trial. It is the view of Justice Rutledge that the rule
limiting questions to prior similar offenses is subject to the same objections as the rule laid down by the majority of the Court in the principal
case, except that it reduces the scope and volume of the allowable
questions.
The "fair-play rule" urged by Justice Rutledge in his dissent in the
Michelson case23 is based on the proposition that the prosecution should
not be given any greater freedom in rebutting a showing of good character or in cross-examining a defense witness than the defense has in
rescnting such evidence of good character. Thus, since the defendant
i- limited to showing his general reputation to be good, the prosecution's
ox idence of bad character likewise should be limited to general repuUlaic~n.

On the surface such a co-extensive limitation would appear to be desirablc for two reasos: it would prevent the natural prejudice which results to the defendant when information as to his prior acts of misconduct are brought forth, and it would reduce the possibility of irrelevant
issues being brought into the trial proceedings. 24 However, when considered in the light, of the purpose for which cross-examination of a
defense witness to good character is permitted, namely to test the basis
of the witness' evaluation of character, it appears that the "fair-play
rule" would not achieve that purpose as fully as a rule allowing more
extensive cross-examination. As Wigmore says, permitting such crossexamination is not a relaxation of the principle which precludes the
prosecution from attacking the defendant's character initially, but a
liberty to refute the defendant's claim of good character. Otherwise a
defendant, secure from refutation, would have too clear a license unscrupulously to impose a false character upon the court. 25 This is the
basis of the broad scope of the federal rule and as Justice Jackson states,
in the Michelson opinion, "while the law gives the defendant the option
to show as a fact that his reputation reflects a life and habit incompatible
with commission of the offense charged, it subjects his proof to tests of
credibility2 6designed to prevent him from profiting by a mere parade of
partisans.
So long as the scope of the cross-examination is limited to refuting the
good character asserted, even though the prior acts of misconduct may
be substantially different from that for which the defendant is on trial,
there would appear to be no undue hardship or prejudice to the defendant. Thus, as in the Michelson case, where the defendant seeks to
establish a good character which includes the traits of "honesty and
truthfulness" and "being a law-abiding citizen", the prosecution should
be entitled to cross-examine as to any prior acts inconsistent with the
asserted good character, Since the good character which Michelson
sought to establish was broader than the crime charged, it may, be refuted by questions as to prior acts which are unlike the offense charged,
but which proceed from the same defects of character which the witness
said the defendant was reputed not to exhibit.
H. Lmvrn
______STA'NLRY

23 335 U, S, 469, 495 (1948),
24 See Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed., 1940) §988 for a discussion of the problems
involved in handling the cross-examination of character witnesses,
25 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed., 1940) §58,
26Michelsoii v, United States, 335 U, S, 469, 479 (1948),

